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Abstract: A new axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence for
n-person games based on independence of irrelevant strategies is given. Using
a flexible general model, it is proved that the Nash equilibrium correspondence
is the only solution to satisfy the axioms of non-emptiness, weak one-person
rationality, independence of irrelevant strategies and converse independence of
irrelevant strategies on the class of subgames of a fixed finite n-person game
which admit at least one Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that these axioms
are logically independent.
1. Introduction
Characterization of game theoretical concepts through axioms has
been a standard approach in non-cooperative and especially in coopera-
tive game theory. The earliest and most celebrated result is the axiom-
atization of the Nash bargaining solution, Nash [5]. For non-cooperative
games, the axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium correspondence (NE),
Nash [6] and its refinements was first studied by Peleg and Tijs [7]. The
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key concept was that of a reduced game which is obtained by fixing the
strategies of some players and letting the rest of the players play the
original game. They called a solution consistent if a solution to the origi-
nal game when restricted to a subset of players remains a solution to the
reduced game. Their main result was that one-person rationality (OPR),
consistency (CONS) and converse consistency (COCONS) uniquely de-
termine NE. They also touched upon the subject of using independence
of irrelevant strategies (IIS) in the axiomatization by showing that the
dummy axiom (DUM) and IIS imply CONS. Ray [9] further studied the
relationship among CONS, IIS, DUM and a weakening of the dummy
axiom (WDUM). Peleg, Potters and Tijs [8] gave conditions under which
they could do away with COCONS. In these works, however, consistency
and not IIS was in the focus.
In this note we set up a scheme to axiomatize NE for finite n-person
normal-form games where IIS and its converse, converse independence
of irrelevant strategies (CIIS) play the central role. Of course, we also
need non-emptiness (NEMP) and a weaker form of one-person rational-
ity (WOPR). The general framework is flexible, allowing for all sorts of
different truncated games (this is how we call the subgames introduced
by Gilboa et al. [3] and studied subsequently by Ray [10] and Shino-
hara [13]).
The acceptability of IIS, let alone that of CIIS, is an issue that
we do not want to address here. Even its close relative, independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) has been understood in many ways in
various contexts and still is a subject of disagreement and debate. On
one hand, its main appeal is that in the optimization context it reduces
to the relaxation principle which is the basis of many algorithms and
can hardly be questioned. On the other hand, in the human decisions
context theoretical considerations as well experiments cast serious doubts
on its plausibility. From an ocean of relevant literature on the subject
we only refer to the classical works of Luce and Raiffa [4] and Sen [12].
We do not want to argue either in favor or against IIS, the purpose of
this note is not more than show that an IIS-based axiomatization can be
an alternative to the reduced game approach.
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2. The main result
Let a finite n-person game G = {N, (Si)i∈N , (fi)i∈N} be given in
normal (strategic) form, where N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 1 is the finite set of
players, Si, i ∈ N is the finite strategy-set of player i, and fi : S −→ R
is her payoff function defined on the profile-set S = ×i∈NSi. We use
the standard notation S−i = ×j∈N, j 6=iSj and s−i for an element of S−i.
The game G is kept fixed throughout and is referred to informally as the
“large game”. A set Ti ⊂ Si, i ∈ N is said to be a truncated strategy-set,
T =×i∈NTi a truncated strategy profile-set and GT ={N, (Ti)i∈N , (fi)i∈N}
a truncated game. Obviously, GS = G. A player whose strategy set in a
truncated game is a singleton is called a dummy, and a game where every
player is a dummy is said to be trivial. A game with n − 1 dummies is
called a one-person game. A one-person game with two strategies for the
non-dummy player is said to be semi-trivial. A game is called simple if it
is either trivial or semi-trivial. All other games are termed non-simple.
A crucial role in the axiomatization is played by a family of trun-
cated strategy profile-sets Ω with the following properties:
Property 1. S ∈ Ω.
Property 2. {s} ∈ Ω for all s ∈ S.
Property 3. For every non-simple game G, for the non-dummy player
i ∈ N , to any y ∈ S and zi ∈ Si, zi 6= yi there exists a one-person game
GT = {N, ({yj}j∈N,j 6=i, Ti) , (fi)i∈N}, T = Πj∈N,j 6=i{yj} × Ti ∈ Ω, Ti 6= Si
such that {(yi, y−i), (zi, y−i)} ⊂ Ti.
An example of Ω satisfying Properties 1–3 is the set of all truncated
profiles T = ×i∈NTi where Ti consists of all one- and two-element subsets
of Si and Si itself.
Let Γ be the set of truncated games GT where T ∈ Ω. We call
a set-valued function ϕ : Γ → S a solution (correspondence) if to any
game GT ∈ Γ it assigns a set ϕ(GT ) ⊂ T. We require of ϕ to satisfy the
following four axioms for any game GT ∈ Γ:
Axiom 1 (Non-emptiness, NEMP). ϕ(GT ) 6= ∅.
Axiom 2 (Weak one-person rationality, WOPR).
a) For every semi-trivial game GT where the (single) non-dummy
player i has strategies ri, qi ∈ Ti
ϕ(GT ) = {(x, t−i) ∈ T : fi(x, t−i) = max{fi(ri, t−i), fi(qi, t−i)}.
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b) For every non-simple one-person game
GT = {N, ({yj}j∈N,j 6=i, Ti), (fi)i∈N}, Ti 6= Si,
ϕ(GT ) = {(x, t−i) ∈ T : fi(x, t−i) = max
ri∈Ti
fi(ri, t−i)}.
Axiom 3 (Independence of irrelevant strategies, IIS ). If x ∈ ϕ(GT ) and
x ∈ R ⊂ T , R ∈ Ω, then x ∈ ϕ(GR).
In order to formulate Axiom 4 we need the following definition.
Given the game GT ∈ Γ and solution ϕ, define
ϕ∗(GT ) = {x ∈ T : R ∈ Ω, R 6= T , x ∈ R =⇒ x ∈ ϕ(GR)}
if G is non-simple,
ϕ∗(GT ) = ϕ(GT )
if G is simple.
Axiom 4 (Converse independence of irrelevant strategies, CIIS ).
ϕ∗(GT ) ⊂ ϕ(GT ).
WOPR is weaker than the usual OPR because it only requires in-
dividual rationality in “smaller” one-person games and not in the whole
large game. In the special case when Ti consists of all one- and two-
element subsets of Si and Si itself, WOPR amounts to the rationality of
pairwise comparisons.
We mention that IIS as defined in Axiom 3 coincides with the clas-
sical definition only if Ω contains all subsets of S. Axiom 3 provides
flexibility in the choice of Ω to accommodate for needs of special classes
of games.
CIIS requires that a solution obtained by putting together solutions
of “smaller” games in a coherent way should be a solution of a “larger”
game. The analog in decision theory (the case n = 1) when the “best”
alternatives are to be selected from a finite list is that if an alternative
is “best” in all properly selected sublists it is an element of, then it
should be “best” in the entire list. In other contexts this is called “basic
expansion consistency”, see Sen [12].
Denote by NE the solution that assigns to any game G ∈ Γ the
(possibly empty) set of NE ’s. From now on we define Γ to be the set
of finite games that admit at least one NE. The following is our main
result.
Theorem 1. On Γ the Nash equilibrium solution NE is uniquely deter-
mined by NEMP, WOPR, IIS and CIIS.
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The proof of the theorem goes through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1. If a solution ϕ on Γ satisfies NEMP, WOPR, IIS, then for
any GT ∈ Γ we have
ϕ(GT ) ⊂ ϕ∗(GT ) ⊂ NE(GT ) ⊂ NE∗(GT ).
Proof. Observe that IIS can be reformulated as ϕ(GT ) ⊂ ϕ∗(GT ). We
claim that ϕ∗(GT ) ⊂ NE(GT ). If GT is simple, then the claim is obviously
true, since by definition, ϕ∗(GT ) = NE(GT ). In the case GT is non-
simple, assume on the contrary that there exists a y ∈ ϕ∗(GT ) that
is not an NE. Then there is a player i ∈ N and a strategy zi ∈ Ti
to satisfy fi(zi, y−i) > fi(yi, y−i). By Property 3, there exists a one-
person game GR = {N, ({yj}j∈N,j 6=i, Ri) , (fi)i∈N}, Ri 6= Ti such that
{(yi, y−i), (zi, y−i)} ⊂ Ri. By WOPR we have y /∈ ϕ(GR) and thus by
the definition of ϕ∗(GT ) we get y /∈ ϕ∗(GT ), a contradiction. Since
y ∈ NE(GT ) is also an NE of any game GR if R ⊂ T , by the relaxation
principle of optimization theory we have NE (GT ) ⊂ NE∗(GT ), and the
proof is complete. ♦
Lemma 2. If the solution ϕ satisfies NEMP, WOPR and CIIS on Γ,
then NE (GT ) ⊂ ϕ(GT ) for any GT ∈ Γ.
Proof. Denote M =| S |. We call a natural number t admissible if there
is a T ∈ Ω such that | T |= t. Put the admissible numbers in increasing
order 1 = t1 < t2 < t3 <, . . . , < tk <, . . . , < tq = M .
The proof goes by induction on the indices k of the admissible
numbers. If k = 1, i.e. for trivial games, the claim obviously holds, since
all strategy sets are singletons and thus NE (GT ) = ϕ(GT ). For semi-
trivial games, i.e. if t2 = 2, k = 2 we have NE (GT ) = ϕ(GT ) by WOPR.
Assume that NE (GT ) ⊂ ϕ(GT ) for any 1 ≤ k < r and let GR ∈ Γ be a
game for which | R |= tr ≥ 3. Thus
ϕ∗(GR) = {x ∈ R : P ∈ Ω, P ⊂ R,P 6= R, x ∈ P =⇒ x ∈ ϕ(GP )}.
By induction and the definition of ϕ∗(GR), if for all 1 ≤ k < r, that
is, for all P ∈ Ω, P ⊂ R,P 6= R,| P |≥ 1 we have NE (GP ) ⊂ ϕ(GP ),
then NE ∗(GR) ⊂ ϕ∗(GR). By CIIS, ϕ∗(GR) ⊂ ϕ(GR). From the proof
of Lemma 1 we know that NE (GR) ⊂ NE∗(GR). So we come to the
conclusion that NE (GR) ⊂ ϕ(GR) for any r, in particular for r = q, and
the claim of the lemma follows. ♦
Lemma 3. The solution NE satisfies NEMP, WOPR, IIS and CIIS
on Γ.
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Proof. Satisfying NEMP, WOPR, IIS is trivial. By using the same
argument as in the proof of Lemma 1 one can prove that CIIS is also
satisfied. ♦
Proof of Theorem 1. From Lemmas 1 and 2 we get ϕ(G) ⊂ NE(G) ⊂
⊂ ϕ(G) implying ϕ(G) = NE(G) which together with Lemma 3 estab-
lishes the claim of the theorem. ♦
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Lemma 1, ϕ is a refinement of
NE.
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of Lemma 2, ϕ is a generalization
of NE.
Now we will show by three examples that WOPR, IIS and CIIS are
logically independent. (NEMP is assumed throughout to make the other
three axioms meaningful).
Example 1. Define the solution ψ by ψ(GT ) = T. Then obviously ψ
does not satisfy WOPR. Since ψ′(GT ) = ψ(GT ) = T , therefore ϕ satisfies
IIS and CIIS.
Example 2. Let B(x) be the set of best replies to x ∈ T . Define
the solution ψ by ψ(GT ) = ∪x∈TB(x). Take the one-person game GT
defined in Axiom 2. Then ψ(GT ) = NE(GT ) as required by WOPR and
thus ψ satisfies WOPR. The solution ψ obviously satisfies CIIS if GT is
simple. If GT is non-simple, then assume by negation that it does not
satisfy CIIS. Then there is a y ∈ ψ∗(GT ) such that y /∈ ∪x∈TB(x). Since
y ∈ ψ∗(GT ), by the definition of ψ∗(GT ) there is a set R ∈ Ω, R ⊂ T ,
R 6= T such that y ∈ ∪x∈RB(x) ⊂ ∪x∈RB(x), a contradiction. Since
ψ 6= NE (NE (G) contains only fixed points of the best reply mapping
B, while ψ(G) may be a superset of NE (G)), ψ does not satisfy IIS.
Example 3. Let K be any strict refinement of NE on Γ, i.e., K(GT ) ⊂
⊂ NE(GT ) for all GT ∈ Γ and this inclusion is strict for at least one game
H ∈ Γ. Define the solution ψ as
ψ(H) = K(H) and ψ(GT ) = NE(GT ) if GT 6= H.
Clearly, ψ is a refinement of NE, therefore it satisfies WOPR and IIS.
Since ψ 6= NE, it does not satisfy CIIS.
Since this axiomatization (and the proof of Th. 1) was inspired
by the landmark work of Peleg and Tijs [7], one might wonder how their
consistency-based axiomatization relates to ours. A valid argument could
be that staying within the class of n-person games with n fixed instead
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allowing the number of players to be any natural number not exceeding
n is not a matter of substance since a game with some dummies is a
reduced game though formally it is defined as an n-person game. This
cannot be done, however, if in the class of games the number of players
is not bounded. Disregarding this “nuance”, the two axiomatizations are
different in substance.
Most importantly, the domain of the axiomatization is different in
the two approaches. Here it is a subset of the truncated games of a
fixed large game and this subset could be much smaller than the set of
all games even if the number of players is not fixed. Disregarding this
fact, one might try in order to bring the two axiomatizations together
to define the family of games Ω as all games where every strategy set is
either the entire Si or a single strategy {si} for all i ∈ N. In this setup,
Property 3 cannot be satisfied and should therefore be abandoned. Then
Axioms 3 and 4 correspond to CONS and COCONS, respectively, in
Peleg and Tijs [7], but a difference remains between WOPR and OPR
since WOPR only requires one-person rationality of “smaller” games, as
argued earlier. The general framework allows for Ω to be a larger set than
Peleg and Tijs’es. Then IIS is stronger, CIIS is weaker than CONS and
COCONS, respectively, and we really have a different axiomatization.
Ray [9] demonstrates that CONS in the reduced game framework cannot
simply be replaced by DUM (or WDUM for that matter) and IIS, since,
as he shows, CONS does not imply IIS. Our result suggests that if CONS
is to be replaced by IIS, then COCONS also is to be changed to CIIS,
or something similar. These axioms of the reduced games based and
truncated (subgame) based approaches do not mix in the axiomatization
of NE.
As Peleg, Potters and Tijs [8] point out, an axiomatization as stated
in Th. 1 is not quite satisfactory because the solution concept ϕ (in this
case NE) to be characterized explicitly plays a role in the definition of
the domain of games ϕ is defined on. Though this approach is used e.g.
in Aumann [2], a characterization where the definition of the domain
of games is independent of ϕ is preferable. This is the case for ordinal
potential games.
A finite game G = {S1, . . . , Sn; f1, . . . , fn} is said to be an ordinal
potential game if there is a (potential) function P : S → R such that for
all i ∈ N, si, ti ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i we have
fi(si, s−i)− fi(ti, s−i) > 0⇔ P (si, s−i)− P (ti, s−i) > 0.
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It is well known, Rosenthal [11], that a finite ordinal potential game
always has at least one NE. Since for each T ⊂ S the above equivalence
when restricted to T holds, the game GT is also a finite ordinal potential
game. Thus Th. 1 holds, i.e., the axiomatization set forth in Sec. 2
works for finite ordinal potential games if the family of truncated strategy
profile-sets Ω is properly chosen.
It is worth mentioning that the axiomatization works for any kind
of finite potential games (cardinal, exact etc.). It is also known that
congestion games as defined in Rosenthal [11] are finite potential games.
Thus our axiomatization also bears on this important class of games. In
the subclass of simple congestion games each player’s strategy set is the
same finite set (with cardinality of at least 2) of facilities and payoffs
depend only on how many of the players use a particular facility. For
details see e.g. Ashlagi et al. [1]. For the family of truncated strategy
profile-sets in addition to the sets specified in Properties 1 and 2, we take
all 2-facility subsets of the strategy sets. 2-facility simple congestion
games exhibit special features, see Ashlagi et al. [1], which make the
IIS-based axiomatization more appealing.
3. Conclusion
In this note an axiomatization of NE was given for subgames of
finite n-person games which is based on the concept of independence of
irrelevant strategies (IIS) and converse independence of irrelevant strate-
gies (CIIS). Extensions of the results to infinite games will be the subject
of a subsequent paper.
By analogy, one may wonder whether converse independence of
irrelevant strategies (CIIS) can be got rid of in some classes of games,
similarly as it is done in Peleg, Potters and Tijs [8]. It could also be
the subject of further research to modify the general framework for the
axiomatization of various refinements and generalizations of NE.
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